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THE PERILS OF PUBLIC OPINION
Deborah W. Denno*
Societies have always determined what conduct should be crimi-
nal.' The key questions are, who in society should make that determina-
tion? How much voice should laypeople have? Should some public
voices be louder than others?
Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal
Law 2 ("Justice") is a rich, creative, and intriguing book with an ambi-
tious goal: to examine the extent to which laypersons' views of justice
(their "moral intuitions") are reflected in current criminal codes.' This
goal is fueled in part by two beliefs: (1) public opinion can help deter-
mine the nature and extent to which certain behavior warrants retribu-
tion,4 and (2) individuals seem more likely to respect and obey laws that
they view are morally right The book's authors demonstrate the value
of interdisciplinary research by producing a superb work that brings out
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia, 1974; M.A.,
University of Toronto, 1975; Ph.D., 1982, J.D., 1989, University of Pennsylvania. I presented an
earlier version of this Article at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Joint Program between the Section on Criminal Justice and the Law and the Section on
Social Sciences. At the Annual Meeting I very much benefited from questions and discussion. I am
most grateful to William Bowers and Lawrence Fleischer for comments and suggestions; however,
they are not responsible for my mistakes. I give special thanks to Juan Fernandez for his character-
istically superb work in locating, collecting, and tabulating all the data that this Article analyzes,
as well as for creating this Article's tables and figures. Jennifer Burns was a very helpful research
assistant. For generous research support, I thank Fordham Law School and Vanderbilt Law School,
where I was a Visiting Professor of Law when I wrote this Article.
1. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTA'DING CRIM NALLAw 1-2 (2d ed. 1995); 1 WAYNER.
LAFAvE & AUSTN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTAN UvE CR IINAL LAW 14-15 (1986).
2. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JusTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
3. See id. at xv.
4. See id. at 4-5.
5. See id. at 6-7. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)
(concluding from research that people are much more apt to obey laws that they view as morally
just and much more apt to break laws that they believe are morally incongruent).
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the best in their respective fields (law and psychology), and which il-
luminates in a way that neither field could do alone.6
Justice measures the link between public belief and legal reality by
analyzing eighteen original studies of selected individuals' perceptions
of a wide array of disputed legal issues7 concerning three main questions
in the criminal law: (1) what conduct should be considered criminal?
(for example, in the case of omissions liability);8 (2) when should con-
duct that is typically considered criminal become lawful? (for example,
the use of deadly force in self-defense);9 and (3) what degree of pun-
ishment is appropriate within and between offenses? (for example, the
grading of different levels of homicide, and the grading of homicide
relative to other offenses)." Given this depth and interdisciplinarity,
Justice represents the redeeming but rare effort to assess public opinion
in terms of "thoughtful, considered judgments" rather than the "top-of-
the-mind, offhand views" reflected in most public opinion polls."
Attempts to glean the public's views of justice are particularly
critical now. Opinion polls show that crime remains among the most
important problems in the United States. 2 Moreover, a substantial pro-
portion of Americans continue to express limited confidence in the
criminal justice system.'3 Americans also believe that courts are exces-
6. Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley are each renowned for conducting ground-
breaking work in their respective fields of law and psychology. I agree with Professor Christopher
Slobogin's view that Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Law ("Justice") is "a
model for interdisciplinary work." Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science
to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 316 (1996) (reviewing
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILrTY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIaws
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995)).
7. See infra app. tbl.1 (summarizing the 18 studies and legal issues). The 18 issues are, in
order of presentation in the book: attempt, criminal risk, complicity, omissions, use of deadly force
in self-defense, use of force in defense of property, citizens' law enforcement authority, culpability
and mistake/accident defenses, culpability and complicity, voluntary intoxication, negligence, in-
sanity, immaturity and involuntary intoxication, duress and entrapment, sexual offenses, felony
murder, causation, and punishment for multiple offenses. See id.; ROBINSON & DAR.LEY, supra
note 2, at 14-197.
8. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 13.
9. See id. at 53.
10. See id. at 157.
11. DANIEL YANKELOViCH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN
A COMPLEX WORLD xii (1991) ("Most public opinion polls are misleading because they fail to
distinguish between people's top-of-the-mind, offhand views (mass opinion) and their thoughtful,
considered judgments (public judgment)."). Id.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATIsTIcS-1997, 100, tbls.2.1, 2.2 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998)
[hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS].
13. See id. at 106, tbls.2.15, 2.16.
[Vol. 28:741
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sively lenient. 4 Media coverage of crime explains much of the public's
interest in, and criticism of, the criminal justice system.'5 Regardless,
one trend is clear: public opinion has a marked effect on criminal justice
policymaking on every level.'6
This Article discusses the significance of Justice's approach to un-
derstanding law and why the book is an excellent springboard for fur-
ther research comparing community standards and legal codes.'7 How-
ever, this Article particularly emphasizes the perils of incorporating
public opinion into the law based upon three major sources: (1) this Ar-
ticle's own study of national and New Jersey demographic and political
affiliation data, (2) the results presented in Justice, and (3) the results of
public opinion research.
Part I of this Article reviews and critiques Justice's methodology
and sample selection procedures. Discussion focuses in particular on a
comparison between the demographic characteristics of Justice's sam-
ple and this Article's own analyses of United States Census Bureau and
New Jersey demographic and political affiliation data for 1990, the year
the Justice sample was selected in New Jersey. Part I concludes that
Justice's sample is "extraordinary," not "ordinary," in the way that Jus-
tice characterizes it. Justice's respondents are far wealthier, more highly
educated than the rest of the country, and include a disproportionate
number of individuals affiliated with either the Republican or independ-
ent parties. Although Justice does not report race and ethnicity, it ap-
pears that minorities may have been underrepresented. In turn, females
are somewhat overrepresented.
Part II discusses briefly the importance of a sample's demographic
make-up, as well as a study's measurement instrument, in the context of
the following problems that are associated with much public opinion re-
search: (1) the public does not hold a singular view of crime and crimi-
nals; (2) the public lacks knowledge about crime and the law; (3) indi-
viduals' views about crime and criminals are often offense-specific and
influenced by demographics and media exposure; (4) individuals'
demographic characteristics impact on their attitudes toward the police,
14. See id. at 135-36, tbl.2.50.
15. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINAL JusTicE 4 (1997) ("Although attitudes are formed and modified by direct and indirect
experiences, in the area of crime and justice, the news media are predominant.").
16. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
17. Prior reviews of Justice have provided a superb foundation for this discussion. See Slo-
bogin, supra note 6; Tom R. Tyler, Public Attitudes on Criminal Justice, 7 CalM. L.F. 697 (1996)
(reviewing PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COM-
MUwNITY VIEWs AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995)).
2000]
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courts, and legislative definitions of crimes; (5) most laws do reflect
community standards and those that do not are morally justified; and (6)
a marked community consensus exists about the seriousness of crimes,
suggesting that it is on this level that "moral intuitions" can be more
precisely gauged and determined.
This Article suggests that public opinion research may fail to
measure accurately the public's fundamental values or "moral intui-
tions." Rather, it may be far more successful in reflecting individuals'
erroneous knowledge and distorted attitudes, which can range enor-
mously depending on demographics and personal experiences. This Ar-
ticle considers whether the goal of incorporating community standards
into the law at the level Justice recommends can be achieved with any
accuracy under even the most ideal empirical circumstances. This Arti-
cle also questions whether the attempt is worth the effort in light of the
potential measurement problems. Lastly, this Article points to research
showing that public opinion already has a marked effect on police,
courts, legislatures, and politicians. It seems the public can be quite suc-
cessful in achieving the goal Justice has proposed for it, at least in the
areas and on the levels the public believes significant. Given the pub-
lic's influence, it may be a worthy effort to educate the public more
about how the law actually operates in order to correct the distorted im-
pressions the public currently holds. Therefore, whatever impact indi-
viduals do have can better reflect a reasoned, educated, judgment rather
than personal experience.
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH MEASURING COMMUTNnY CONSENSUS AND
"ORDINARY" PEOPLE
Justice contends that laypersons typically derive their views of
justice not from moral philosophy but rather from "intuitive notions"
that people think are "shared by the community of moral individuals."t8
Justice attempts to examine these "moral intuitions" that "ordinary
people" embrace by "testing the belief of many individuals that their
moral intuitions reflect a community consensus."' 9 By investigating
whether shared standards do in fact exist, the book depicts "at least the
beginnings of the outlines of 'community standards'-those views that
are held by ordinary members of our communities about criminal liabil-
ity and punishment."' On the basis of its study, Justice concludes that
18. RoBINsoN& DARLEY, supra note 2, at 1.
19. a
20. Id.
(Vol. 28:741
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legal codes and community standards do not always share similar
rules." The authors express the modest hope that these results will"generate debate on criminal codes."
Justice does not define what it means by "moral intuitions," and
does not elaborate specifically on the term "ordinary people." The book
also does not empirically support its contention that individuals believe
their intuitions "reflect a community consensus." Regardless of these
drawbacks, a first step in analyzing Justice's results is to examine two
sources: (1) the make-up of the "ordinary people" whose views underlie
much of the book's discussions and conclusions, as well as (2) the
book's measures of moral intuitions.
A. Justice's Approach to Measuring
"Community"
1. The Selection of "Ordinary" People
Who are the "ordinary" people comprising the "community con-
sensus?" Webster's Dictionary defines "ordinary" as "not uncommon or
exceptional: not remarkable: routine, normal ... lacking in excellence,
superior merit, uncommon appeal, or distinctive characteristics." 3
Justice is somewhat vague and contradictory about describing the"ordinary" people who constitute its sample. The authors concede that
the procedures used in selecting their respondents were problematic:
"Putting it inelegantly, we grabbed whomever we could get our hands
on. Typically, the subjects were neighbors, family, or friends of the stu-
dents"24 who helped the authors with their study, that is, Rutgers-
Camden law students or Princeton University psychology students.'
The authors note that they excluded two groups: (1) "those familiar
samples of convenience, such as college sophomores,"' and (2) indi-
viduals involved in or familiar with the criminal justice system because
their opinions could be influenced by their knowledge of the legal
codes.2
21. See id. at 2.
22. Id.
23. WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1589 (1993).
24. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 222.
25. See id. at 10.
26. Id. at 8.
27. See id. Specifically, the authors barred "[l]aw students, lawyers, and persons involved in
the criminal justice process, such as police officers" because the authors believed "that their re-
2000]
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The individuals included in Justice's sample are characterized in
conflicting ways. On the one hand, the authors state forthrightly that
their "accidental samples"' of subjects "were not selected to represent
the population of the United States or even of a particular state or juris-
diction. They were individuals whom [they] contacted who were willing
to participate."29 Moreover, for future research, the authors recommend
that "it may be useful to turn to more self-consciously drawn samples
that are constructed to be demonstrably representative of various popu-
lations that are defined by the code-drafting conditions as central."3 On
the other hand, the authors conclude that their subjects' "demographic
distributions" were "sufficiently broad" to provide "the beginnings of a
set of demonstrations of the judgment patterns of typical citizens of the
United States on liability and punishment issues."'" Does this mean that
although the authors "grabbed whomever [they] could," they fortunately
ended up with a group of individuals who were "sufficiently" diverse
demographically and representative of "typical citizens of the United
States?" It is difficult to tell.
2. The Testing Procedure
Justice's study was "designed and executed" at Rutgers University
School of Law at Camden in seminars held during the Fall 1990 and
Spring 1991 semesters.32 Faculty and graduate students from the Prince-
ton University Department of Psychology assisted.3 After the subjects
agreed to participate in the study, the authors asked for the subjects'
views on the "appropriate" liability level-criminal sentence-to give
perpetrators for different crime scenarios that reflected one of eighteen
legal issues. As the summary in Table 1 shows,.' these crime scenarios"usually" shared core identical elements and varied only with respect to
particular factors the authors believed would influence the subjects'
perceptions of liability.Y The subjects were to indicate their liability as-
sessments on a continuum scale, shown in Table 2," that consisted of
the following thirteen choices: N (no criminal liability); 0 (criminal li-
sponses might be driven by their knowledge of the details of the legal codes." Id. at 222.
28. Id. at 223.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 10, 219.
33. See id.
34. See infra app. tbl.1.
35. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 218.
36. See infra app. tbl.2.
[Vol. 28:741
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ability, but no punishment); or choices 1 through 11, which reflected
prison sentences spanning respectively from one day (1) to the death
penalty (11)." As this Article notes later, the truncated nature of this
scale may have influenced the study's results.8
According to Justice, more than seven hundred individuals partici-
pated in the authors' studies? 9 However, it is not entirely clear how
many individuals participated in the particular eighteen studies the book
analyzes.' For unknown reasons, Justice reports demographic character-
istics for only the 307 subjects examined in the first semester's sample."
Regrettably, the tables of results on individual scenarios fail to specify
either the sample size or the demographic composition of the subjects
responding. The authors explain that "more than thirty people"42 partici-
pated in each study and that "[f]orty subjects per study is typical";43
however, it is not clear how many, if any, of those subjects participated
in more than one study or scenario. The demographic breakdown for
each study is also critical to know because factors such as sex, race, age,
income, etc. substantially influence individuals' perceptions. 44
Commendably, the authors clearly emphasize the limitations of
their research and remind the reader of its preliminary nature.4' At the
same time, however, the authors refer to their subjects as "ordinary
people ' and "ordinary members of our communities.4 7 Who are these
ordinary people and how diverse are they compared to residents of New
Jersey and the United States? A brief attempt to examine this question
reveals some of the perils and problems with measuring "community"
views in general.
B. Justice's "Extraordinary" People
An analysis of census and political affiliation data shows that the
Justice subjects are "extraordinary," not "ordinary," based upon the
37. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 223.
38. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
39. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 220.
40. The authors explain that they "conducted upward of twenty different studies," although
the book does not report all of them. Id. at 10.
41. See id at 223.
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 223.
44. See infra notes 48-74, 80-89 and accompanying text.
45. ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 10-11.
46. Id at xv.
47. l at 1.
2000]
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demographics Justice reports, which are replicated in Table 34 Notably,
Table 3 does not report: (1) race and ethnicity, or (2) cross tabulations
to determine if there are interaction effects among the demographic
factors that it does present (age, income, education, sex, and political
affiliation). For example, if Republicans are more heavily represented in
the higher incomes, it is unclear how much "being a Republican" is
symbolic of a political view or of an income level. Preferably, these
factors should be examined simultaneously as predictors (in a regression
equation, for example) to control for these possible kinds of interaction
effects.
It is helpful to compare the Justice data with the 1990 United
States Census Bureau data and New Jersey statistics, keeping in mind
that all three sources use different demographic category cut-off points
that hamper a more precise examination."9 First, with regard to age, Ta-
ble 3 shows that over one-third of the Justice respondents are less than
thirty years of age (37.9%), over one-half are less than forty years of
age (55.7%), and 80% (79.9%) are less than fifty years of age; only
9.7% are over sixty years of age.- This relatively youthful distribution
comports with the fact that most respondents were selected by students.
Moreover, New Jersey residents are relatively younger than the United
States population as a whole if one focuses on the age group of sixty-
five and over.n ' As Tables 4 and 5 show, for example, although the Cen-
sus Bureau includes individuals age fifteen and older (the approximate
cut-off point for Justice was age twenty),52 the 1990 United States
population is considerably older than both the New Jersey residents and
the Justice respondents.53 Over one-quarter of the United States popula-
tion (27.7%) are over fifty-five years of age and 16.5% are over sixty-
five years of age; in contrast, the twenty-five to thirty-four age group
constitutes less than a quarter (22.6%) of the sample m
48. See infra app. tbl.3. It is presumed that the subjects in the "high school" and "college"
categories obtained their high school and college degrees, although the authors do not make that
clear.
49. Comparisons are hampered in part by the different demographic categories that Justice,
the United States Census Bureau, and the New Jersey statistics use. Table 4 attempts to comport
with the demographic breakdowns in Justice as much as possible, while Table 5 presents the Cen-
sus Bureau's actual category breakdowns.
50. See infra app. tbl.3.
51. See infra app. tbls.4, 5, 10.
52. See infra app. tbl.3.
53. See infra app. tbls.3, 4, 5, 10.
54. See infra app. tbls.4, 5.
[V/ol. 28:741
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Demographics show more clearly that the Justice respondents have
substantially higher incomes compared to New Jersey residents and the
United States as a whole.55 One-third (33.5%) of the Justice sample
earned over $54,000, nearly one-fifth (18%) earned over $70,000, and
slightly more than 6% (6.4%) earned more than $100,000.56 In contrast,
only 11.5% of New Jersey residents earned over $50,000
(approximately two-thirds fewer individuals than Justice), and 4.1%
earned more than $75,000, the highest income category available. 7
Even more striking are the income differences for the United States
population: only 6.6% earned over $50,000 and only 2.2% earned over
$75,000.
The Justice respondents also have markedly higher educational
levels compared to New Jersey residents and the United States as a
whole. 9 Nearly three-quarters of the Justice respondents (73.6%) had at
least a college degree and over one-quarter (26.4%) had some sort of
graduate degree."a In contrast, slightly over one-quarter of the New Jer-
sey residents had at least a college degree (27.2%) and only 11.1% had
a postgraduate or professional degree.6 As would be expected, however,
United States population education levels were even lower: 22% had
four or more years of college and 9% had five years or more of college
(and not necessarily a graduate degree). 62
Presumably, the relatively higher income and educational levels
among the Justice respondents accounted for their substantial diver-
gence in political affiliation. The Justice sample was nearly equally dis-
tributed among three affiliations: Democrat (32.3%), independent
(31.1%), and Republican (36.6%).63
A range of different sources of political affiliation datae4 show that,
in general, there is a higher proportion of Democrats than Republicans
55. See infra app. tbl.19.
56. See infra app. tbl.3.
57. See infra app. tbl.ll.
58. See infra app. tbls.4, 5.
59. See infra app. tbl.20. See also supra note 48 (discussing categories of educational level).
60. See infra app. tbl.3.
61. See infra app. tbl.il.
62. See infra app. tbls.4, 5.
63. See infra app. tbl.3.
64. This Article's political affiliation data are based upon voting trends in the Presidential
and House of Representatives elections during the 1990s. Data on actual political party enrollment
are difficult to retrieve. Most states are only recently releasing this type of information in an ac-
cessible manner, usually in the form of a page within a State Department or Secretary of State web
site. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission, Combined Federal/State Disclosure and Election
Directory 2000 (visited May 7, 2000) <http:/www.fec.govlpubrec/cfsdd.htm> (a portal site that
20001
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in both New Jersey and the United States population.M Furthermore, in-
dependents typically constitute a very small proportion of the voting
population depending, of course, on how "independent" is defined. In
Table 16, for example, 43% of the 1992 presidential votes in the United
States and New Jersey were Democratic relative, respectively, to Re-
publican (37.4%, 40.6%) and Perot (18.9%, 15.6%); in striking contrast,
less than one percent were "other" (0.64%, 0.8 6%).' The differences are
even more striking in the 1996 results when the Perot category disap-
pears: There is a substantially higher percentage of Democrats in both
the United States population total (49.2%) and particularly the New Jer-
sey total (53.7%).67 These figures are in sharp contrast to the respective
percentages of Republicans (40.7%, 35.9%), Reform (8.4%, 8.5%), and"other" (1.7%, 1.9 %).'" Even if one were to add the Reform and "other"
categories together, they would still constitute only approximately 10%
of the vote in both the United States and New Jersey. The House of
Representatives election results for 1990-1998 in Table 17 show, in
1990, a smaller percentage of Democrats than Republicans in New Jer-
sey (45.8% and 49.9% respectively) compared to the total United States
population (52.9% and 44.9% respectively).69 Regardless, in both New
Jersey and the total United States population, respectively, the percent-
age of "other" is less than 5% (4.3%, 2.1%).70
leads to the various state web pages that report election and voting data). The web sites usually
report recent years' data; earlier years' data are reported either in state yearbooks or not at all. This
Article rejected other sources, such as the occasional table in the annual STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
for two reasons: (1) small sample sizes; or (2) incompatible data presentation. See e.g., STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACrOF THE UNrtED STATES 1999, 299, at tbl. no. 486 (1999).
65. See infra app. tbls.16-18. The exception to this distribution is political affiliation based
on the House of Representatives election results, where there are more Republicans than Demo-
crats in many of the categories. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
66. See infra app. tbl.16. Recent voting trends in New Jersey suggest a growing number of
unaffiliated voters in formerly Republican controlled townships. These voters are responsive to
"Clinton" Democrats, but consider themselves independent of the major parties. See Laura
Mansnerus, Those Hills Are Filling Up, But Not With Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at
14NJ2; see also State Judge Invalidates New Jersey's Voter Registration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2000, at B4; Ronal Smothers, Ruling Will Let Third Parties Share in the State's Largess, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at 14NJ2 (articles reporting on a recent New Jersey Superior Court decision
that overturned a state law that limited voters to register only as Democrats, Republicans, or inde-
pendents, suggesting that in the past a number of New Jersey voters who registered as belonging to
the "Independent" Party really considered themselves independent from the two major political
parties).
67. See infra app. tbl.16.
68. See infra app. tbl.16.
69. See infra app. tbl.17. Notably, 1998 statistics show this trend is starting to reverse. See
id.
70. See id.
[Vol. 281741
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The Justice sample's income, educational, and political affiliation
data suggest that minorities were underrepresented, even though in
1990, New Jersey had a higher proportion of Black and Hispanic indi-
viduals relative to the United States population.7 In contrast, the Justice
sample included a somewhat higher proportion of female subjects
(56.4%)2 relative to New Jersey (51.2%)"3 and the United States popu-
lation (51.1%),74 both of which showed a more symmetrical sex distri-
bution.
Overall, Justice's respondents are far wealthier and more highly
educated than the rest of the country. They also include a dispropor-
tionate number of individuals affiliated with Republican and independ-
ent parties. Although Justice does not report race and ethnicity, it ap-
pears that minorities may have been underrepresented. In turn, females
are somewhat overrepresented.
C. Who Are the "Ordinary" People?
The 1990 United States and New Jersey census data show a wide
range of age, income, educational, and political affiliation. While the
Justice sample also shows some diversity in these demographic catego-
ries, it is far more representative of wealthier, more educated, and more
politically conservative individuals. Research suggests that this kind of
demographic make-up could substantially impact on Justice's results.75
Demographic categories are not static. As would be expected, 1998
data show that individuals are becoming older and more educated in the
total United States population.7 6 In New Jersey, however, they are be-
coming slightly younger and more educated.77 Moreover, political af-
filiation data show that New Jersey residents are becoming somewhat
more Democratic over time relative to the United States population,78
although the proportion of independents in the United States and New
Jersey remains small.79
71. See infra app. tbls.6, 12.
72. See infra app. tbl.3.
73. See infra app. tbl.10.
74. See infra app. tbls.4, 5.
75. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text; see also Tyler, supra note 17, at 701
(noting that Robinson and Darley "do not consider whether the background of their respondents
may have influenced the results").
76. See infra app. thl.8.
77. See infra app. tbls.13-14.
78. See infra app. tbls.16-17.
79. See infra app. tbls.16-18.
20001
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An examination of these distributions and changes therefore raises
the following question: Who are the "ordinary" people? If, as Justice
suggests, such individuals are not expected to represent the United
States or any particular region, who are they expected to represent? Part
II considers briefly a few of the factors that should determine who
should have a voice in deciding what our laws should be.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATING "ORDINARY" PEOPLE'S
VIEWS OF JUSTICE INTO CRIMINAL CODES
Many variables impact on how individuals view the law.8" This Part
examines briefly a few of these variables"1 and how they contribute to
problems with incorporating "ordinary" people's views of justice into
criminal codes. This Part also considers how some of these variables
may have influenced the results in Justice.
A. The Public Holds Diverse Views of
Crime and Criminals
When can the "ordinary" person's "intuitive morals" ever rise
above the impact of that person's particular background, life experi-
ences, demographic characteristics, or even emotions? 2 Justice does not
try to answer that question, although it is key to understanding how the
public views crime and the criminal justice system. Researchers need to
go beyond survey results and investigate the ways people cognitively
approach information and rely on their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes
when making decisions. Otherwise, what may appear to be a person's
fundamental value or "moral intuition" may actually reflect, for exam-
ple, the media's reporting of faulty information on a certain issue. 3
Substantial research and recent cases show that individuals hold
diverse views of crime and criminal justice based on their backgrounds
and demographics. A striking demographic influence is race. When
Bernard Goetz was convicted only on the charge of carrying an unli-
80. Justice rightly pays homage to some of the research on these influences. See ROBINSON
& DARLEY, supra note 2, at 1-3.
81. In particular, this Part turns to ROBERTS & STALANs, supra note 15, which provides an
excellent and very thorough analysis of the public's attitudes toward crime and criminals in the
context of the surge of new polling and public opinion research.
82. See, e.g., THE PAssIoNs OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (examining the role that
emotions play in the decision-making capabilities of different actors in the criminal justice system
and considering which emotions are appropriate in a legal context).
83. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 3-4.
84. See id. at 8.
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censed concealed weapon, and was acquitted of all other charges result-
ing from the shooting of four black youths in a New York City subway,
surveys showed that the great majority (83%) of whites supported the
verdict relative to less than half (45%) of blacks." Likewise, a deep ra-
cial split existed in polls taken at various times before, during, and after
the O.J. Simpson trial: Substantially more blacks than whites were sym-
pathetic to Simpson, believed that the charges against him were untrue,
that he was not guilty, and that he would not receive a fair trial. 6 Such
attitudes are not surprising given that far more blacks than whites in Los
Angeles reported having experienced (or known people who had experi-
enced) discourteous and even brutal police behavior." This level of dis-
trust is mirrored in national statistics." Lastly, how individuals viewed
the highly publicized rape trials of William Kennedy Smith and Mike
Tyson, and the comparisons between them, often cut across both race
and gender lines of experiences."
B. The Public Lacks Knowledge About Crime,
Crime Rates, Offender Characteristics, and
Legal Reforms
Justice strives to test the perceptions of "ordinary" people outside
the criminal justice system so that their responses will be devoid of
knowledge of the legal code." On the one hand, this approach appears
commendable because it attempts to control individuals' experiential
bias. Yet, there are reasons why this screen illustrates a strong argument
for limiting the public's contributions to criminal codes: Most people
are simply uninformed about matters significant to criminal justice pol-
icy.91
85. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 199 (1988).
86. See GILBERT GEs & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY: FROM LEOPOLD AND
LOEB TO OJ. SMIPSON 186 (1998).
87. See hL
83. See infra app. tbl.23.
89. See Deborah W. Denno, Why Rape is Different, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 129-30, 131
n.24 (1994) (discussing the stereotyping and stigma surrounding the occurrence of a rape, as well
as the consequences of reporting a rape).
90. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
91. See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 324 (noting that the community of individuals tested in
Justice "is generally uninformed-both in the sense that it has not thought deeply about the rele-
vant issues, and in the sense that it does not know the legal context in which a given legal provi-
sion operates").
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Opinion polls in the United States and other countries show that
the public has little knowledge of the nature and extent of crime.2
Moreover, what little knowledge the public has is substantially dis-
torted. As Table 21 shows, for example, a common public mispercep-
tion is that crime rates are increasing, particularly rates of violent crime,
when in fact they are declining or stabilizing.93 Likewise, the great ma-
jority of offenders and parolees do not become repeat offenders, in con-
trast to widespread public beliefs that they do.'
In general, then, the growth in public concern over crime appears
unrelated to any escalation in crime rates or the proportion of crimes in-
volving violence. At the same time, fear of and concern about crime is
unevenly distributed across the country. Generally, such fear represents
an inverse relationship with the amount of crime victimization experi-
ence. For example, Asian Americans, who are least apt to be victimized,
are far more likely to identify crime as a problem facing their commu-
nity than African Americans, who are most apt to be victimized."
Opinion polls also show that people have limited or poor knowl-
edge of their basic legal rights, or of particular pieces of legislation,
even highly publicized legal reforms.6 The general public evidences"very little" knowledge of sentencing structure or of the severity of
punishments that the legal system actually imposes.'
These findings prompt several concerns about interpreting Jus-
tice's results. First, Justice's extraordinary people are probably going to
be among those who fear crime the greatest but, given their demo-
graphic make-up, actually experience it the least. Next, if the Justice re-
spondents' views are consistent with the public's, their overestimate of
crime rates and re-offending, as well as their underestimate of the
criminal justice system's sentencing severity, could influence their per-
ceptions of certain legal doctrines. For example, according to Justice's
92. See infra notes 93-94.
93. See infra app. tbl.21.
94. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 520 tbl.6.68. Despite the even
greater decline in crime since 1997, the year that Table 21 was created, see infra tbl.21, individu-
als still believe there is more crime now than a year ago. See ROBERTS & STALANs, supra note 15,
at 8.
95. See ROBERT & STALANS, supra note 15, at 2; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 12, at 179 tbl.3.2 (the category "Other" in this table is composed of Asians, Pacific Islanders,
American Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos). Id at 596. In 1998, of the total number of murder vic-
tims, about 49% were white, 47% were black, and 2% were Asians, Pacific Islanders, and Native
Americans. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS-CRiME IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, 14, at tbl.2.4 (1999).
96. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 35.40.
97. See id. at 43-47.
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authors, the Justice sample is far more lenient than the law about allow-
ing citizens to act in self-defense, in part because the sample distrusts
the legal system's effectiveness." However, if it is known that such be-
liefs are distorted, inaccurate, or exaggerated, is it still wise to rely on
them to change the criminal code? Justice acknowledges the problems
with this dilemma," but has difficulty resolving it.
C. The Public's Views About Crime and Criminals
Are Often Offense-Specific and Influenced by
Demographics and Media Exposure
Justice uses particular offenses-seemingly arbitrarily-as a vehi-
cle for studying people's perceptions of key criminal law issues. For ex-
ample, the book's study of "attempt" involves a rather banal account of
a series of steps that Ray, a locksmith, goes through in an effort to steal
from a safe in a coin shop.'00 In contrast, the study of "complicity" con-
cerns a rather sordid arrangement in which John attempts to help the
unhappily married and evil Catherine kill her husband so that she can be
a rich widow. 1 These offense designations are arbitrary because the
study of "attempt" could have involved a more sordid fact scenario in
which the evil Catherine attempts to kill her husband for money, and the
study of "complicity" could have involved a more banal scenario in
which Tom attempts to help his friend Ray steal from a coin shop safe.
Did the inflammatory or neutral nature of the respective fact sce-
narios and parties involved affect how the Justice sample responded? In
particular, did the respondents view the attempt steps that Ray took far
more leniently than the Model Penal Code ("MPC") because Ray was
engaging in an act that, even if completed, would never have resulted in
physical harm (much less death) to anyone?"° Did the respondents view
the attempt steps more leniently because Ray, in contrast to Catherine,
did not appear to be a dangerous, evil, or immoral person? Did the re-
spondents view the attempt steps more leniently because Ray was a
male and was acting far more consistently with his gender role than a
98. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 80.
99. See id.
100. See infra app. tbl.1.
101. See infra app. tbl.1.
102. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 14-28 (discussing the Model Penal Code's
("MPC") approach to attempt liability and comparing it to the respondents' views on the subject);
see also infra note 126 and accompanying text (noting that 77% of the Justice subjects would not
punish in cases where the defendant took a substantial step, in contrast to the MPC).
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female would have been?"H These questions are unanswerable. How-
ever, research suggests that such differences could have been influen-
tial, thereby pinpointing the weaknesses of any kind of empirical re-
search proposing to measure individuals' perceptions of the criminal
law.
Not surprisingly, individuals' views about crime and criminals are
often offense-specific. Such views are also influenced by respondents'
background characteristics and the degree of their exposure to mass
media."° For example, research indicates that individuals have stereo-
typical visual images of what "an offender" looks like (young, male,
physically unattractive) and that both blacks and whites are more likely
to link criminality to racial minorities. °" Moreover, individuals dispro-
portionately associate minorities with crimes of violence. In one study,
for example, respondents were more likely to attribute assaults, thefts,
and muggings to blacks, but attribute fraud, embezzlement, and counter-
feiting to whites." s
As would be expected, stereotypes about rape offenders and vic-
tims are strongly influenced by gender." Research shows that across
ethnic groups, women are less likely than men to subscribe to widely
held myths about rape,'t including myths about male rape victims.'"
Justice notes that the respondents did not support the MPC's provisions
on rape.' 0 Such divergence would be expected because the MPC provi-
sions on rape are so dated. However, it is not unlikely that the dispro-
portionate number of females in Justice's sample also affected these re-
sults. Even a slight gender imbalance in the sample could be significant
because the study sample sizes were so small, and because the gender
split (if any exists) is quite predictable. Such offense-specific biases
provide yet one more reason to control for possible demographic influ-
ences in such research.
103. See Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 80, 86 (1994) (noting that "because crime and violence are associated with male-
ness, society deems women who engage in crime to be 'doubly deviant'-defying both the law
and their gender role").
104. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 125.
105. See id at lll-13.
106. See id. at 114.
107. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 534-37; HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS
AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 63 (1980).
108. See infra app. tbl.22 (listing various myths about rape).
109. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 121.
110. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 204.
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D. The Public's Views on Criminal Justice
Policies or Constitutional Issues Can Be
Affected by Different Cognitive Styles of
Infonnation Processing
The nature and type of an individual's prior knowledge can influ-
ence how that individual processes and selects information, makes de-
cisions, and changes beliefs in different contexts.'11 For example, a sub-
stantial amount of research has demonstrated associations between
judicial behavior and complexity of thought processing in the context of
judges' different political affiliations, social classes, ages, religions, le-
gal educations, and ethnic backgrounds. 12 Yet, all individuals use"cognitive heuristics" (mental short cuts) as an efficient and pragmatic
means of processing information, irrespective of the consistency or
complexity of their prior beliefs."' Such heuristics include: (1) simula-
tion (carryover of recently recalled information to give context to the
problem or hypothetical provided), (2) availability (forming a response
based on information about a topic that is easily recalled), and (3) repre-
sentativeness (when memory of a specific event or individual is applied
to a whole group)."4
Simply because an individual uses a heuristic, however, does not
mean that person's decision is biased. The nature and extent of any ex-
isting bias depends upon whether the beliefs guiding the individual's
decision are distorted, inaccurate, or irrelevant to the decision the indi-
vidual makes."' For example, the decision to adopt a particular criminal
justice policy or constitutional reform frequently requires an individual
to make a choice between one or more of several conflicting values that
the individual may possess (for example, conflicting values concerning
when a search is reasonable). Research indicates that people with con-
flicting values are more likely to incorporate community sentiments in
their decision-making as compared to people who have consistent val-
ues and well-informed beliefs."6 Those with more consistent beliefs ap-
111. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 77-81, 104.
112. See generally JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971) (explaining
the results of a study on the sentencing behavior of magistrates).
113. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 104; see also Susan Bandes, Patterns of
Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 1275, 1313 (1999) (discussing, within
the context of the dangers of using anecdotes to help promote certain laws, "the
'representativeness heuristic' [which] is one of a set of legitimate and absolutely essential cogni-
tive tools, which permit people to think beyond the information given; to form inferences").
114. See ROBERTS & STALANs, supra note 15, at 77-81.
115. See id at 105.
116. See id.
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pear far less likely to consider all the information presented before
them, and will therefore be too closed-minded." 7 Moreover, prior
knowledge and different modes of information processing can influence
how individuals respond to detailed stories as well as abstract ques-
tions."' These findings suggest that researchers should ask their subjects
whether they have conflicting values about the topic for which they are
being tested, and whether they believe the topic is important."9
The make-up of the study instruments also could affect individu-
als' responses. For example, a respondent in Justice could have judged a
property crime more leniently if, before reading about it, the respondent
read about a gruesome murder case rather than another type of property
crime.' Likewise, respondents may be affected by the particular age,
occupation, gender, etc. of the defendants and victims portrayed in all
the fact scenarios. Looking at Table 1,121 a researcher can only wonder if
respondents would be as sympathetic to Suzanne and William Smith
(issue seven) if both were young, lived together in an apartment, and
had different occupations, such as a dancer or a bartender. Would it
make a difference if Joe (issue seven) was a CEO and arrived home
from work to find a man attempting to steal his Rolex watch? Prefera-
bly, Justice, or studies like it, would devise an instrument with identical
or very similar underlying fact scenarios for each of the issues being
tested so that the potential effect of such underlying identifiers could be
controlled.
E. Most Laws Do Reflect Community Standards
Research suggests that the public has a substantial influence on
lawmaking, either directly or indirectly, in ways that Justice does not
acknowledge explicitly."z This Section looks more closely at this issue
by examining the results in Justice, as well as recent studies showing
the public's effect on courts, legislatures, and politicians. This Section
also considers the substantial concordance between the public's and the
law's views of crime severity, suggesting that it may be in this realm
that "moral intuitions" could more strongly appear.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 104-05.
119. Seeid. at 106.
120, See Tyler, supra note 17, at 701.
121. See infra app. tbl.1.
122. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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1. Justice's Results
According to Justice, some areas of agreement between the re-
spondents and the MPC include the following: (1) the degree of liability
for a violation should depend to a considerable extent on the person's
culpability level; (2) "excusing conditions" in legal codes should be
granted and validated; (3) there should be support for justification de-
fenses and support in general for the felony-murder rule; (4) negligence
should trigger liability in intoxication cases; and (5) the degree of con-
trol and cognitive dysfunction in insanity cases should be evaluated.'2'
Some areas of disagreement pertained to the different issues stud-
ied:
Sexual offenses: The Justice subjects do not treat consensual inter-
course with an underage partner as seriously as the MPC, and do not
give significant mitigation to forcible rape between parties familiar with
one another."
Liability grading: The Justice subjects assigned greater punishment
with heightened culpability, whereas codes typically define only mini-
mum culpability for an offense. The Justice study suggests that codes
should include multiple grades according to culpability level.'2
Attempt: Seventy-seven percent of the Justice subjects would im-
pose no punishment in cases where the defendant took a substantial
step, whereas the codes impose immediate liability. The subjects gen-
erally supported the common law approach to attempt and the majority
rule of giving a discounted liability for attempt, as opposed to equal
punishment with the perpetrator. The responses suggest that codes ought
to distinguish and punish more severely instances where the harm ac-
tually occurs or the prohibited conduct is consummated.2 6
Felony Murder: The Justice subjects tended to punish mere acci-
dental killings during a robbery as less serious than manslaughter, al-
though most codes would punish those killings as murder. A "felony-
manslaughter" rule may be more appropriate.'27
Justification: The Justice subjects seemed to desire more grading
in justification defenses. According to the subjects, if a mistake as to
justification does not give a defense, it at least mitigates. Moreover, the
123. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 203-04.
124. See ia at 204.
125. See id. at 204-05.
126. See id. at 205.
127. See it at 205-06.
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subjects were more willing to allow force in defense of self or property,
or in exercising their law enforcement role."'
Omissions: The Justice subjects seemed to desire criminalization or
more serious treatment of some actions than the code gave. Studies sug-
gest new offenses should be created or liability expanded.!
Upon reading the areas of disagreement between the MPC and the
Justice subjects, a criminal law professor may see strong similarities
between the Justice subjects' impressions and the typical views of first
semester law students. With time, training, and explanation, however,
criminal law professors find that law students begin to understand the
reasons why certain laws operate, and therefore start to alter their im-
pressions.'" Moreover, legal education guides students to examine how
all the issues and MPC provisions interrelate; in contrast, the Justice re-
spondents only read a series of selected and seemingly independent fact
scenarios.
Law school education is a global, interconnected enterprise in the
way that participating in a study could never be. This is why we train
lawyers. Asked another way: Would we ever consider it acceptable to
give laypersons a strong voice in determining how medical procedures
should be conducted during surgery? Even though laypeople are being
operated on, and could suffer severely if the procedures are faulty,
would the medical community be warranted in following laypeople's
views? In sum, the Justice authors "do not discuss the question of how
lawmakers might decide when to follow public opinion and when to
keep formal laws that are discrepant with public views, out of deference
to the special knowledge and expertise of legal authorities.''
2. Laypersons' Views of Crime Severity
Estimating crime severity is the one area where laypersons' views
seem most concordant, for several reasons: (1) survey respondents show
more agreement than disagreement in the seriousness rankings of most
crimes; (2) there is a "significant degree of consensus" in crime serious-
ness rankings across different social groups; (3) there is a "fair degree"
128. See id at 206-07.
129. See id at 208.
130. See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 324. Professor Slobogin reported the results of an infor-
mal study he conducted with new law students showing that on the first day of class the students
believed the penalty for attempt should not be the same as for the completed crime. However,
when the students were asked again seven weeks into the semester, approximately 75% of the
class believed the penalty for attempt should be the same as for the completed crime presumably
due to their understanding that "luck and fortuity do not diminish culpability." See id.
131. Tyler, supra note 17, at700.
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of concordance in crime seriousness rankings across different countries;
(4) the strongest degree of social consensus appears in crime serious-
ness rankings for the most serious and least serious crimes; (5) indi-
viduals rate crimes of violence highest on the crime severity scale; and
(6) the least amount of social consensus exists for crimes between the
two extremes of seriousness. 32 Moreover, some research suggests that
public views concerning the severity of crimes "exhibit a high degree of
subtlety, nuance, and ethical reasoning." ''
Unfortunately, Justice's thirteen-point liability scale contains une-
qual time increments that disproportionately reflect light penalties.TM
Apart from the methodological problems associated with this type of
scale,'35 it may underestimate the extent to which the subjects demon-
strate concordance on crime seriousness rankings. Preferably, a crime
seriousness scale would provide the subjects with a starting anchor of
some sort (for example, a score of ten for stealing a bicycle), 36 but then
otherwise allow them to provide their own numerical rank uncon-
strained by legal or sentencing structures. This way, moral intuitions
can be tapped apart from institutional rules.
3. The Public's Effect on Legal Institutions
Recent research suggests that public opinion does influence the
public policies carried out by the House, Senate, President, and the Su-
preme Court.37 Moreover, this influence exists at a level and speed that
would be expected from constitutional design.' For example,
"politicians constantly and immediately process public opinion changes
in order to stay ahead of the political curve";' 39 in contrast, public opin-
132. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 15, at 71-72; see also MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY v (1985) (explaining the
results of a 60,000 person survey on the seriousness of various crimes).
133. Mark Warr, The Polls-Poll Trends: Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment, 59 PUB.
OPINION Q. 296, 296 (1995) (citation omitted).
134. See infra app. tbl.2.
135. See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 330-31.
136. See WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 132, at vi-x (listing the severity scores, ranging from
72.1 to 0.2, and the respective offenses used in the survey).
137. See James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 543, 543
(1995); see also William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajori-
tarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 87, 96 (1993) (analyzing empirical data suggesting that "public opinion exercises important
influence on the decisions of the Court even in the absence of changes in the composition of the
Court or in the partisan and ideological make-up of Congress and the presidency").
138. See Stimson et al., supra note 137, at 543,560.
139. Id. at 560. Describing an extreme example of a politician immediately processing public
opinion polls, one writer notes:
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ion has a relatively slower but still substantial effect on the Supreme
Court." As one study concluded: "Understanding politics well, the
constitutional framers were correct in expecting short-term politics to be
a fundamental part of dynamic representation.' 41
The swift reforms in the insanity defense following the John
Hincldey, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, verdict provide a classic
example of the strong and fast impact of public opinion. Polls conducted
the day after the verdict was announced showed so much public indig-
nation that legislative and presidential reaction and change was imme-
diate. 14 2
A current concern is that public opinion not only has too much in-
fluence, but that refusal rates among potential respondents are ex-
tremely high.4 4 For this reason, pollsters and social scientists are be-
ginning to doubt the validity of many of the surveys gathered for
politicians and the media.'" Increasingly, public opinion polls fail to re-
flect the kinds of diverse demographics that should constitute the
"community consensus."' 45 Once again, the question arises: Who are the
"ordinary" people whose views now guide society's decision-makers?
Alternative ways of incorporating community opinions into the le-
gal system have proved controversial and problematic. There are split
views, for example, on the value and feasibility of jury nullification. 46
President Clinton is such a devoted student of public opinion polls that his aides say he
can recite, from memory, the American people's double-digit tastes on a wide array of
issues. Besides using survey data to help shape some of the most important decisions of
his presidency, Mr. Clinton has also consulted polls before deciding whether his family
should go to the beach or the mountains on their summer vacations.
Don Van Natta, Jr., Silent Majorities: Polling's 'Dirty Little Secret': No Response, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1999, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1.
140. See Stimson et al., supra note 137, at 560.
141. Id.
142. See Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The
Public's Verdict, 47 PuB. OPINION Q. 202, 202-03 (1983). For example, Delaware passed new
legislation a day after the verdict was announced. See id.
143 As one article explains: "Pollsters say response rates have fallen as low as 20 percent in
some recent polls, which means that as many as 8 out of 10 people initially asked to participate in
a poll refused to be interviewed. Ten years ago, polling response rates were typically at least 50
percent." Van Natta, Jr., supra note 139, at 1.
144. See id.
145. See id (noting the concern voiced by some scholars "that the public's diverse demo-
graphics aren't being reflected in poll results").
146. See generally CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE
(1998) (defending the jury's right and power to diverge from judicial instructions); Slobogin, su-
pra note 6, at 332-33 (recommending using the jury and sentencing structure "as occasional safety
valves"). But see ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 2, at 213 (contending that jury nullification
contravenes the principle of legality); Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the
Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 433, 474-77 (1998) (arguing that rec-
[Vol. 28:741
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 762 1999-2000
PERILS OF PUBLIC OPINION
Moreover, even without the extreme measure of nullification, there are
difficulties with garnering representative juries147 who are able to com-
prehend complicated legal proceedings.'" In essence, this Article agrees
with prior recommendations that educating the public about the law is a
preferred route for enhancing the chances that when the public does in-
fluence, it does so wisely.149
III. CONCLUSION
This Article discusses the potential for incorporating public opin-
ion into the law by way of reviewing the wonderfully written book, Jus-
tice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law.
Justice analyzes eighteen original studies of individuals' perceptions of
disputed legal issues and reports that laypersons' views of justice (their
"moral intuitions") are reflected in some legal doctrines (e.g., the fel-
ony-murder rule) but not others (e.g., the punishment for attempt). Jus-
tice's authors believe that public opinion can help determine the nature
and extent to which certain behavior should be penalized, and that indi-
viduals are more likely to obey laws that they think are morally appro-
priate.
ognizing a constitutional right to nullify would conflict with a defendant's constitutional right to
independent fact finding and legal finality).
147. See Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1452-54
(1997); see also Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94
MICH. L. REv. 2673, 2700-05 (1996) (describing the difficulties encountered by criminal court
judges in preventing jury duty avoidance by veniremembers who lie during voir dire); Nancy J.
King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury
Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 80-99 (1993) (reviewing how and when the racial background of
jurors affect jury deliberations); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Con-
temporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 769-70 (1993)
(noting how voir dire procedures that promote equal racial representation may alienate jurors and
create distrust of jury deliberations).
148. See Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, supra note 147, at 1490-93; see also
SAUL M. KASsiN & LAWRENcE S. WVRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PERSPECIVES 144-56 (1988) (discussing the sometimes convoluted manner in which
jury instructions are communicated and juries' difficulties in interpreting them); Randy Borum &
Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evi-
dence Toward Informed Policy, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 126 (1999) (noting jurors' lack of
comprehension concerning instructions on the insanity defense); David E. Rovella, Poll Elicits
Fear of Rogue Jury, NAT'L J., Nov. 2, 1998 at A25 (responding to a poll, 42% of potential jurors
stated an unwillingness to accept a defendant's right to the Fifth Amendment protection from self-
incrimination).
149. See SAMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE TOLERANT
PUBLIC 1 (1999) (explaining the importance of educating the public in order to safeguard civil lib-
erties); Slobogin, supra note 6, at 324-27 (promoting the value of educating the public about the
law).
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Justice contributes an invaluable interdisciplinary approach to un-
derstanding the law. Yet, this Article concludes that there are more per-
ils than positives linked to serious reliance on laypersons' views of legal
doctrines. This conclusion is based upon this Article's analysis of three
major sources of information: (1) this Article's own examination of
United States Census Bureau and New Jersey demographic and political
affiliation data for 1990, the year the Justice sample was selected in
New Jersey; (2) the empirical results that Justice reports; and (3) the re-
sults presented in other public opinion research. In sum, this Article
questions whether measurements of laypersons' "moral intuitions" can
ever be free from the effects of individuals' demographic characteristics
and life experiences. The perils of public opinion are discussed briefly
below.
A. The Problems with Public Opinion
Research Methodology and Sample
Selection Procedures
It is difficult to acquire a representative sample of "ordinary peo-
ple" for assessing public opinion, or even to know what such a sample
should look like demographically. For example, this Article's compari-
son of the demographic and political affiliation differences between
Justice's sample and the United States and New Jersey census bureaus'
samples suggests that Justice's sample is "extraordinary," not ordinary,
in the way that Justice characterizes it. Justice's sample is substantially
wealthier, more highly educated, more female, and more apt to be af-
filiated with either the Republican or independent political parties as
compared to sample respondents in the rest of the country. Justice's
sample also may have underrepresented minorities (Justice does not re-
port the race and ethnicity of its sample). However, this Article recog-
nizes that creating a "representative" sample is problematic, particularly
in light of the declining numbers of people who are willing to partici-
pate in public opinion surveys.
B. The Substantial Impact of a Sample's
Demographic Make-up on Public Opinion
Research Results
A sample's demographic make-up is critical for evaluating the va-
lidity and reliability of public opinion research for a number of reasons:
[Vol. 28:741
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1. The public holds diverse views of crime and criminals that
oftentimes vary according to the respondents' demographic
characteristics and methods of cognitively approaching
information. In light of this variance, Justice does not attempt
to answer a key question that goes to the heart of understanding
the public's views of crime and criminals: When can an
individual's "intuitive morals" ever be independent of that
individual's demographic make-up or personal life
experiences?
2. A wide range of survey research indicates that the public lacks
knowledge about crime, crime rates, offender characteristics,
and legal reforms. In turn, these misconceptions could
influence the "ordinary" person's perceptions of certain legal
doctrines. Justice acknowledges the problems with relying on
laypersons' distorted, inaccurate, or exaggerated beliefs, but
does not propose adequate solutions for how those problems
should be resolved.
3. The public's views about crime and criminals are often
offense-specific and influenced by demographics and media
exposure. For example, research indicates that individuals have
stereotypical images of how an offender should look
demographically. These images vary according to the type of
crime being analyzed (e.g., violent vs. non-violent crimes) and
the type of person being questioned (e.g., females vs. males).
Justice does not consider how these factors could influence its
sample's views on the fact scenarios detailed in Justice's
research instrument, particularly given the variations in the
types of crimes and actors who are presented.
4. The public's views on criminal justice policies or
constitutional issues can be affected by how individuals
cognitively process information. For example, an individual's
prior knowledge and life experience can influence how that
individual processes and selects information, makes decisions,
or is swayed by different circumstances. With regard to an
individual's decision to adopt a particular criminal justice
policy or constitutional reform, for instance, research indicates
that people with conflicting values are more likely to
incorporate community sentiments in their decision-making as
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compared to people who have consistent values and well
informed beliefs. Moreover, the make-up of a study's
instrument could affect subjects' responses depending upon the
different order in which crimes are presented (e.g., a property
crime may look less serious if it is followed by a gruesome
murder case), or the issues being tested.
5. Most laws do reflect community standards. This Article
reaches this conclusion based upon three sources of
information: (1) the results in Justice showing a range of areas
of agreement between the study respondents and the MPC's
provisions; (2) research indicating the substantial degree of
homogeneity among different laypersons' estimates of crime
severity; and (3) recent research demonstrating the marked
effect of public opinion on the policies and decisions carried
out by the House, Senate, President, and Supreme Court. Such
research has prompted concerns that some public opinion may
have too much influence particularly in light of the very high
refusal rates among those individuals who are solicited and the
corresponding doubts among pollsters and social scientists
concerning the validity of the surveys gathered for politicians
and the media.
Justice is enormously enlightening on a wide range of topics. Fu-
ture research could focus on two additional issues: (1) how to educate
an already highly influential public about the intricacies of legal doc-
trine so that they can make more informed decisions, and (2) how to en-
sure that this influential public bears some semblance to the "ordinary"
person. If ordinary individuals are more apt to respect and obey laws
that they believe are morally just, it seems likely that they will be more
apt to respect and obey laws that they more fully understand.
[Vol. 28:741
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1.
A SUMMARY OF THE EIGHTEEN CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES AND FACT
SCENARIOS STUDIED IN JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME*
ISSUES FACT SCENARIOS
1. Objective Ray, a locksmith, goes through several steps in his attempt to steal from
requirements of a safe in a coin shop. The steps range from "thought only" to
attempt "completed offense - renounces but unable to 'undo."'
2. Creating a criminal Mary, unhappy in her fifteen-year marriage to Tom, decides to kill Tom
risk with poison to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce. Tom's
injuries from the poison range from "slight injury" to "high injury."
3. Objective John knows that Catherine is unhappily married and he wonders if she
requirements of wants her husband dead, which would make her a rich widow. John
complicity perceives Catherine as a woman quite capable of murder and he thinks
of approaching her with a plan in which he would be willing to help her
kill her husband. Before he can approach her about the plan, however,
Catherine shoots her husband dead. John's attempts to help Catherine
range from "only thinks of helping" to "masterminds."
4. Omission liability Walt, age 38, and Vic, age 16, are strangers on a pier built over a deep
body ofwater. Suddenly, Pete, also a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic
into the water, and then immediately runs away. Both Pete and Walt are
practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt cannot swim and he does
not want Vic to drown. However, Walt does not throw Vic a lifesaving
flotation device that is on the pier even though he knows the device will
save Vic. Vic drowns and Walt later explains he "just didn't want to get
too involved." Walt and Vic's relationship ranges from "stranger" to"parent," to "high" and "low danger," to "high" and "low
inconvenience."
5. Use of deadly force Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for protection. He is
in self-defense walking down a deserted city street on his way back home one night
when a man comes up and asks for money. The man continues to pester
Paul and Paul then shoots and kills the man. Paul's perceived degree of
self-defense ranges from "killing, no self-defense" to "believes deadly
force is not necessary but mistakenly believes deadly force legal."
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6. Use of force in
defense of property
7. Citizens' law
enforcement authority
Joe arrives home from work and finds a man attempting to steal his
motorcycle. When the man does not respond to Joe's protests, Joe grabs
the man's arm and then hits him in the face. Apparently in pain, the man
runs off and is later apprehended by the police. Joe's perceived degree
of necessary force ranges from "necessary force" to "deadly force,
believing it lawful."
Suzanne and William Smith are a middle-aged married couple living in
a two-story home. Suzanne, a secretary, works a day shift and William
works an evening shift at a local car manufacturing company. Suzanne,
who is typically home alone at night, keeps a weapon next to her bed in
case there is an emergency when she goes to sleep. The series of events
that occur when Suzanne goes to sleep range from "rape: deadly force
-actual offender" to "property destruction: nondeadlyforce-mistaken
identity."
8. Offense culpability A series of scenarios concerning different individuals' awareness of
requirements and property damage or consent during sexual intercourse, ranging from "as
mistake/accident to causing damage to house," to "as to causing damage to unimproved
defenses property," to "as to house belonging to another," to "unimproved
property belonging to another," to "victim's lack of consent in rape," to
"victim being underage in statutory rape."
9. Culpability Mark and Gregory drive to the plant where they work. Mark, who has
requirements for not been drinking, drives because Gregory has been drinking. After they
complicity park, Gregory asks Mark for the car keys because Gregory wants to
drive home to change before work. The series of events that then occur
range from "purposeful as to assisting driving, knowing as to causing
death" to "reckless as to assisting driving, reckless as to causing death."
10. Voluntary Brian wants to kill his roommate because his roommate stole Brian's
intoxication girlfiiend. Brian starts beating his roommate, who later dies. Brian's
desire either to injure or kill his roommate, and Brian's various states
of intoxication while beating, range from "purposeful killing -
control" to "pre-intoxication faultless killing - negligent intoxication."
11. Individualization Sam decides that he wants to go hunting by himself in a very remote
of the objective area where he believes there are no people but a lot of wildlife, including
standard of negligence bears. One morning he hears a noise in the brush and he quickly fires his
gun in the direction of the noise, only to discover he has killed another
hunter. Sam's physical, cultural, and experiential characteristics which
could give some context to why he fired the shot range from "cultural
norms" (he is an American Indian following a tribal custom of hunting
alone) to "substandard education" (Sam had never been hunting before)
to "old age" (he is 82) to "recent upset" (he was mugged only two
nights ago) to "above-normal intelligence." These same standards are
then also applied to a fact pattern on omissions.
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12. Insanity This issue involves a series of scenarios examining insanity under a
wide range of circumstances, such as "murder," "self-defense," and
variations on degrees of control and cognition.
13. Immaturity and Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening
involuntary while both are visiting their grandmother. There has always been some
intoxication dislike between the brothers, whichisparticularlystrongthatnight. The
next series of events involve Mike setting Joe on fire and killing him
under circumstances ranging from "control - murder," to "low control
and cognitive," to scenarios where Mike is 10, 14, or 18 years-old.
14. Duress and Chris, a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record, knows Tom, a local
entrapment defenses drug dealer. The next series of events concern the circumstances under
which Chris makes a delivery of eight ounces of cocaine for Tom. While
making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation.
After a lawful search of the car, the police arrest Chris and charge him
with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The
circumstances range from "control - no duress or inducement' to "no
prior record - buddy."
15. The seriousness of Two people have sexual intercourse together under a range of different
the offense - sexual circumstances in which their sexes, occupations, ages, mental statuses,
offenses and degree of acquaintance with one another vary. Circumstances range
from "Forcible intercourse - straight (i.e., they are strangers)," to
"forcible intercourse-married," to "consensual intercourse - mentally
handicapped female," to "consensual intercourse - female in jail."
16. The culpability of Mark ends up killing someone under a series of circumstances in which
the person - felony a felony is involved, ranging from a "purposeful killing," to a
murder "purposefil shooter, purposeful co-felon, owner victim," to a"negligent
but innocent shooter, purposeful co-felon, owner victim."
17. The strength of the Luman and Alma decide to kill Smith because Smith made disparaging
person's connection remarks about them. They go to Smith's house. While Alma serves as
with the prohibited a watchman, Luman kills or attempts to kill Smith. Luman and Alma
result - causation flee but are subsequently apprehended. Causation is tested under a
requirements series ofcircumstances involving a "subsequent killer," "careless nurse,"
and "accident on way to the hospital."
18. Punishment for One person ends up killing or stealing under series of circumstances
Multiple Offenses involving one or more victims (killing) or items (stealing).
*RoBINso4 & DARLEY, supra note 2. at 229-81.
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TABLE 21.
EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC MISPERCEPTIONS OF CRIME-RELATED STATISTICS*
Public Misperception Reality
Crime rates constantly increasing Crime rates decline or stable over period
1990-1995
Violent crime rate increasing faster than Violent crime rate increasing no faster than
any other kind of crime property crime
Murder rate increasing Murder rate stable or declining in Canada,
Australia and US
The murder rate increased in Canada after Murder rate has declined since abolition of death
abolition of death penalty penalty
Violent crime accounts for approximately Violent crime accounts for approximately 10
half all crime recorded by the police percent of crimes recorded by police; smaller
percent of all crimes committed
Crime committed by a small, easily Crime committed by a wide range of offender
identifiable part of population
Most offenders re-offend, and commit Most offenders not re-convicted. Little spe-
same kind of crime over and over again cialization in terms of criminal careers
Most offenders on parole re-offend Most parolees do not re-offend
Burglary rates increasing faster than other Burglary rates stable or declining
crimes
*JUAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, supra note 15, at 33.
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TABLE 22.
CATEGORIES OF MYTHS ABOUT RAPE AND EXAMPLES OF ATIITUDINAL
STATEMENTS*
Category Items
Cannot Happen/ Victim is * It is impossible for a woman to rape a man.
Responsible for Prevention • Even a big strong man can be raped by another man.
* A woman can be raped against her will.
* 'Nice' women do not get raped.
* A raped woman is a responsible victim not an
innocent one.
Blaming the Victim Most men who are raped by a woman are somewhat
to blame for not being more careful.
In forcible rape, the victim never caused the rape.
Women provoke rape by their appearance.
Women Fantasize about Rape Many women really want to be raped.
Most women secretly desire to be raped.
Rape is About Power All rape is a male exercise in power over women.
Women are trained by society to be rape victims.
Rape is About Sex • Most rapes occur because the rapist desires sex.
* Most rapists are oversexed,
* Rape is a sex crime.
Delay in Reporting A charge of rape two days after the act has occurred
is probably not rape.
Victims who wait several days to report the crime
probably are seeking revenge or attention.
Resistance is a Woman's Role During a rape, a woman should do everything in her
power to resist.
Trauma of Being Raped * Victims are not upset about being raped.
Normality of Rapists * All rapists are mentally sick.
• Rapists are 'normal' men.
'JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETAJ. STALANs, supra note 15. at 118 (1997).
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TABLE 23.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND ETHICAL STANDARDS OF POLICE
OFFICERS'
Caucasian- Hispanic- African-
Dimension American American American
Honesty and ethical 45% 30% 30%
standards (1991)
1992 Gallup poll 43% NA 29%
1993 Gallup poll 53% NA 28%
Harris Poll (1992)b
Great deal of respect 68% 51% 51%
Treating people fairly 68% 54% 38%
Helpfil and friendly' 78% 71% 58%
Solving crimes 61% 57% 43%
Responding quickly to 73% 60% 50%
calls for assistance
Preventing crimne 59% 56% 55%
'Data are based on the 1991, 1992, and 1993 Gallup Polls nationwide surveys of United States residents. The
percentages are those who indicated either "very high" or "high." Data were complied from the 1990, 1992, and 1993
Sourcebooks of criminal justice statistics.
bFor all dimensions below [note b in table 231, data were obtained from tables in the 1992 Sourcebook of
criminal justice statistics and are based on the 1992 Harris Poll nationwide survey of United States residents.
I'he percentages are those who indicated either "excellent" or "very good."dihe percentages are those who indicated either "excellent" or "pretty good."
"JULLAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA . STALANS, supra note 15, at 132 (1997).
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